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 1 Introduction
One of the most notable stylised facts in labour economics is that women earn
substantially less than men. For instance, the European Commission (2006) reports
an average raw wage dierential of about 25 per cent for the EU-25 countries in 2002
and 26 per cent for Germany. While part of this gender pay gap is explained when
introducing controls for individual characteristics (such as education, occupation,
and experience), a substantial part of the gap remains unexplained in all EU-25
countries. In addition to reecting dierences in human capital or occupational
segregation not controlled for, this unexplained part of the gap may also mirror
discrimination against women.1 Although still of considerable size, the gender pay
gap tends to narrow in most countries as in Germany over the last decades.2
While most of the empirical literature on the gender pay gap focusses on the
variation of the gender pay gap between countries and its evolution over time, an
aspect that has attracted far less attention is the regional variation of the gap within
the same country. Though many studies use regional information as control variables
in the estimations, only few explicitly deal with its regional dimension. Blien and
Mederer (1998), for instance, examine regional dierences in the gender pay gap in
Germany based on the wage curve approach, while McCall (1998) deals with the
relation between regional restructuring and gender wage dierentials in the U.S. For
the UK, Phimister (2005) studies dierences in urban wage premia by gender, while
Robinson (2005) analyses the eect of the national minimum wage on the gender
pay gap across regions. For Canada, Olfert and Moebis (2006) examine the dierent
impact of rural and urban environments on gender occupational segregation. The
two studies that are closest to our paper are Loureiro et al. (2004), who do not nd
regional dierences in the gender pay gap in Brazil, and Busch and Holst (2008),
who nd lower gaps in cities than in rural areas in Germany in 2005.
However, to our knowledge, there has been made no attempt to systematically
investigate regional dierences in the gender pay gap and their evolution over time.
What is more, there seems to be no economic theory around that readily explains
1 For a comprehensive review of the huge empirical literature on the gender pay gap, its
determinants, and its evolution over time, see Altonji and Blank (1999). Blau and Kahn (2003)
investigate international dierences in the gender pay gap for 22 countries between 1985{1994.
Moreover, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) provide a large meta-analysis of more
than 260 international studies between the 1960s and the 1990s. Finally, Maier (2007) provides
a survey on the German literature.
2 While Maier (2007) arrives at the conclusion that the gap has remained rather stable during
the last decade, Blau and Kahn (2000) report a decreasing gap for West Germany and for
almost all OECD countries up to the mid 1990s. Taking account of changes in the wage
distributions as well as cohort and life cycle eects, Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002) nd
that the gap has narrowed substantially at the bottom of the wage distribution but to a lesser
extent at the top. Using linked employer{employee data for Germany, Hinz and Gartner (2005)
arrive at the conclusion that within-job pay gaps have shrunk as well.
3why there should be such dierences. The following paper is intended to ll these
gaps.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical
considerations about the regional dimension of the gender pay gap and derives
several hypotheses that will be tested in our empirical analysis. Section 3 lays out
our empirical estimation strategy, while Section 4 describes the data set used. Our
descriptive and multivariate empirical results are discussed in Sections 5 and 6, and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 Beckerian vs. Robinsonian Discrimination
Theoretical attempts of explaining discrimination often follow Becker's (1971)
concept of discrimination due to distaste. Since some employers dislike employing
women, which is modelled by means of a distaste parameter in those employers'
utility function, they oer lower wages to women, ceteris paribus. Why should
there be regional dierences in the gender pay gap in this setting? One
could argue that hot spots, i.e., large metropolitan areas, are trend-setters with
more progressive environments and less discriminatory employers leading to less
Beckerian discrimination. This kind of reasoning, however, suers from several
shortcomings (for details, see Madden, 1977b; Hirsch, 2009). In particular, Beckerian
discrimination is costly for employers and should therefore be competed away in the
long run if labour markets are suciently competitive. Furthermore, `[t]he attitudes
which produce discriminatory behavior are taken as given. There is no consideration
of whether the economic system fosters these attitudes.' (Madden, 1977b, p. 102)
Put drastically, this reasoning arrives at the conclusion of less discrimination in
economic hot spots by just assuming it.
A dierent strand of literature employs a monopsonistic explanation of
discrimination proposed by Robinson (1969), who applies Pigou's (1932) concept
of third-degree price discrimination to the labour market. Other than Beckerian
discrimination, Robinsonian discrimination is not costly for rms the actions of
which remain prot-maximising. In this setting, discriminating against women is
simply the best rms can do. For this reason, it is more likely to survive in the long
run. What is needed for Robinsonian discrimination to work, however, is that labour
markets are imperfectly competitive and that rms face more monopsony power over
their female than their male workers.
Hirsch (2009) presents a simple spatial duopsony model of the labour market in
which workers are located at dierent places, while employers do not exist at each
4potential location. Therefore, workers have to commute, facing some travel cost.
Since employers and the jobs they oer are for this reason not perfect substitutes
to workers, competition among employers is imperfect and rms possess some
monopsony power. Assuming that women have higher average travel cost than men
due to their domestic responsibilities, Hirsch arrives at the conclusion that rms have
higher monopsony power over their female workers giving rise to a gender pay gap. In
a nutshell, this holds because women are less mobile than men and thus less likely
to change employers for wage-related reasons.3 Applying this reasoning, we shall
argue in the following that economic hot spots have thicker labour markets giving
rise to a more competitive environment. And this higher degree of competition,
in turn, not only pushes both female and male workers' wages but also constrains
employers' ability to engage in Robinsonian discrimination. This will be formalised
in the following within a model of spatial oligopsony in the tradition of Nakagome
(1986) and Bhaskar and To (1999).
2.2 The Model
Workers' Labour Supply Behaviour. Assume that equally productive workers'
homes are uniformly distributed along the real line at some density D. Firms
demanding labour are located on the real line equidistantly, the distance between any
two rms being some constant X. Workers supply a unit of labour wage-inelastically
as long as they gain a positive income from working, so that they have a reservation
income of zero. Moreover, a worker chooses the employer such that his or her income
is maximised.
Next, suppose all workers face linear travel cost, that is, the worker's travel cost
is proportional to distance. This cost can be both direct and indirect. Direct cost
results because travelling on its own is not costless, whereas indirect cost follows, for
instance, from the fact that travelling requires time { and thus imposes opportunity
costs { and that it might be uncomfortable to workers. Let t denote the travel cost
per unit distance.
Consider now some rm, say rm i, and its two direct competitors, rms i   1
and i + 1, both distanced X from this rm. Firms are assumed to oer wages
independently of workers' location. Assume that rm i pays some wage w, while
its competitors' wage is  w. A worker distanced x, 0 6 x 6 X, from rm i has travel
cost tx to get to this rm and t(X   x) to get to rm i   1 or i + 1, depending
on which of these is nearer to the worker. The farther rm i, i.e., the larger x, the
3 There are alternative ways of modelling Robinsonian discrimination than spatial monopsony.
For an analysis of Robinsonian discrimination within a search model, see, for example,
Schlicht (1982) and Bowlus (1997). Furthermore, Madden (1977b) investigates Robinsonian
discrimination for segmented local labour markets.
5higher is the worker's travel cost to get to it and the lower is his or her travel cost
to get to the respective competitor of rm i. Accordingly, the higher x, the more he
or she prefers to work for rm i's competitor.
A worker located at x receives an income of w   tx when working for rm i
and an income of  w   t(X   x) when working for the relevant competitor of rm
i. Therefore, he or she works for rm i as long as w   tx >  w   t(X   x) and
for rm i's competitor if the opposite holds as long as his or her income { i.e., the
respective wage oer net of the travel cost { from doing so is positive; for otherwise
the worker would choose not to work at all. Assume for the moment that w+  w > tX
holds, so that all workers decide to work. As we shall see later, this indeed holds
in equilibrium under some mild parameter restrictions. The distance x from rm i
at which a worker is indierent between working for rm i and the relevant of its
competitors, i.e., where w   tx =  w   t(X   x) holds, is given by
x
 =
w    w + tX
2t
(1)
if jw    wj < tX.4 From this it follows that all workers distanced x < x from rm i
prefer working for rm i and all of them distanced x > x prefer working for one of
its competitors.
From this reasoning it follows that rm i's labour supply is given by
L(w;  w) = 2Dx
 =
D(w    w + tX)
t
: (2)
As a consequence, this model generates upward-sloping rm-level labour supply
curves, although each individual worker supplies labour wage-inelastically at the level
of the market (provided participation). The reason for this is that rm i is able to
expand its market area and thus its labour supply at the expense of its rivals provided
that it conjectures that its rivals do not react to a wage change, i.e. @  w=@w = 0. In
the following, we will impose this familiar Bertrand{Nash assumption.
Firms' Wage-Setting Behaviour. We now turn to rms' decisions. Firms are
considered to behave as prot maximisers. We further assume that rms produce a
homogenous good from their labour input with a constant marginal revenue product
of labour .5 Finally, we assume that rms have to pay some xed costs f to set up
4 If, on the other hand, jw    wj > tX were to hold, either rm i or its competitors would
not employ any workers. In a symmetric equilibrium, which we will derive, the condition
jw    wj < tX of course holds.
5 It is straightforward to generalise this setting to the case with a second factor of production,
say capital, and a constant returns to scale production technology. In this case, we get a
constant marginal revenue product of labour for each ratio of the output price and the capital
rental rate due to the rm's optimal adjustment of the capital stock employed (e.g., Bhaskar
and To, 1999). Moreover, Bradeld (1990) shows that the (long-run) marginal revenue product
6business. Therefore, rm i's prots are given by
(w;  w) = L(w;  w)(   w)   f =
D(w    w + tX)(   w)
t
  f: (3)
Firm i's problem is to nd an optimal wage oer w that maximises its prots given
its rivals' wage oer  w, i.e., some w that solves the problem
max
w (w;  w) =
D(w    w + tX)(   w)
t
  f: (4)
In a symmetric equilibrium, the rst-order condition of this problem, i.e.,
@(w;w)=@w
! = 0, can be used to obtain the rm's optimal wage oer given some
xed distance between rms X as
w(X) =    tX: (WSC)
We will refer to (WSC) as the wage-setting condition from now on. In the (X;w)-
plane, (WSC) denes a straight line with slope w0(X) =  t and w-intercept .
Two things are noteworthy: Firstly, if competition becomes erce in the sense that
there are many employers competing for workers, so that X is low, we approach
the competitive solution, where workers get paid their marginal revenue product of
labour. Second, if economic space becomes less densely populated by rms, so that
X increases, the wage chosen by the rms decreases because competitive forces are
weakened.
Now consider what will happen if X is no longer xed. This is achieved by
allowing for free entry and costless relocation of rms. Free entry and costless
relocation means that in the long run rms continue to enter (leave) the market
until prots are driven to zero, so that the distance between equidistant rms X is
endogenised.6 Setting (w;w)






In the following, we will refer to (ZPC) as the zero-prot condition. In the (X;w)-
of labour is constant if the production technology inhibits constant returns to scale and there
is perfect competition as well on all other factor markets than the labour market as on the
rm's output market.
6 In the following, we shall follow the literature in distinguishing the short run, where X is
some xed value, from the long run, where X is pinned down to its zero-prot level (e.g.,
Capozza and Van Order, 1978; Salop, 1979; Greenhut et al., 1987). Note that by imposing the
costless relocation assumption we guarantee the symmetric zero-prot equilibrium's stability
and suppress the whole adjustment process following competitive entry and exit. As Salop
(1979, p. 145) states: `This equilibrium concept is static. In a dynamic context, it assumes
that rms may costlessly relocate in response to entry and, in fact, do relocate. Thus, equal
spacing is maintained.'
7plane, (ZPC) denes an upward-sloping curve with X0(w) = f=[D( w)2] > 0 and
X-intercept f=D. The higher is the wage w, the higher must be X to guarantee
zero prots to the rms. Furthermore, we get a vertical line at X = 0 if the xed
costs tend to zero, so that we also approach the competitive solution if xed costs
disappear causing the setup of rms to be costless.
The Long-Run Equilibrium and Its Properties. Together (WSC) and (ZPC)
determine the symmetric Nash equilibrium under free entry. Combining both (WSC)
and (ZPC) to solve for the long-run equilibrium wage, we obtain
w





Obviously, if  is suciently large, w > tX=2 holds. Then, all workers are oered a
positive income and thus decide to participate, and the equilibrium derived actually
exists. The resulting symmetric zero-prot equilibrium can be depicted in the (X;w)-
plane as the intersection point both of the wage-setting and the zero-prot curve
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1: The symmetric zero-prot equilibrium (X;w).
Now suppose we had two segmented labour markets, where the one labour market
is more densely populated by workers, so that D1 > D0. Note that only the ZPC
is aected by changes in worker density, while they do not alter rms' wage-setting
behaviour. Put dierently, the worker density only inuences the labour market's
overall protability, but has no impact on marginal decision-making. The ZPC's
intercept is shifted to the left, and the curve also becomes atter. As a consequence,
the interception point moves north-west on the WSC: w rises and X falls (see
8Figure 2). Algebraically, we have @w=@D > 0, which immediately follows from
partial dierentiation of (5). Intuitively, the higher worker density makes the labour
market more protable for rms, so that more rms enter the market. This reduces
the distance between rms and therefore raises the competition among rms, so that
the workers' wage rises. Hence, the model predicts that workers earn higher wages
in more densely populated labour markets.





densities D1 and D0 with D1 > D0.
In the next step, we adopt the idea presented and developed in Hirsch (2009)
and assume that women face higher (average) travel cost than men, ceteris paribus.
What might be reasons for dierent travel cost of men and women? We follow his
argument that women have higher indirect travel cost because they (still) play a
more exposed role in household production, particularly in rearing children, than
men. So they attach a higher disutility to the time loss due to commuting, i.e., they
face higher opportunity cost of travelling.7 The ceteris paribus clause in particular
means that we assume men and women to be perfect substitutes in production and
to exhibit the same labour supply behaviour (i.e., they just decide on whether to
participate having a reservation income of zero). Assume further that employers are
free to oer wages separately to men and women, so that women and men supply
7 This is also in line with empirical evidence. For instance, Hersch and Stratton (1997) show
that for the U.S. married women's housework time is, on average, three times that of married
men's and that women's more dominant role in housework is able to explain part of the
gender pay gap in wage regressions. Furthermore, Manning (2003, pp. 203/204) presents some
evidence for the UK that travel-to-work times are lower for women than men, especially for
those with more domestic responsibilities, while an older study by Madden (1977a) nds the
same for women in the U.S. Finally, the Statistisches Bundesamt (2005, Appendix Table 29)
reports a similar pattern for Germany. For a more complete discussion of the relation of gender
dierences in travel cost to the gender pay gap, see Hirsch (2009).
9labour on segregated labour markets. Let t1 denote women's and t0 men's travel cost
per unit distance.
Note that only the WSC's slope is aected by an increase in the travel cost. It
becomes steeper. As a consequence, the interception point of WSC and ZPC moves
south-west on the ZPC: Both w and X fall (see Figure 3). Algebraically, we have
@w=@t < 0, which follows at once from partial dierentiation of (5). Intuitively, the
higher travel cost reduces competition among rms because economic space { the
source of rms' wage-setting power in this framework { becomes more relevant in
this segment of the labour market. And this, in turn, allows more rms to enter the
labour market which has become more protable for them. The model thus predicts
that women should earn less than men, i.e., we have a long-run equilibrium gender
pay gap. Women's wage is lower because rms exploit the gender dierence in the
travel cost to exert third-degree wage discrimination.8





travel cost t1 and men's travel cost t0 with t1 > t0.
Finally, we are interested in the question whether the gender pay gap is higher
or lower in more densely populated labour markets. Partially dierentiating (5)
gives @2w=@D@t > 0. That is, the higher the worker density D, the lower is the
gender wage dierential . Diagrammatically, this can be seen by combining the
8 One objection that could be raised against our reasoning is that in the long run women
may move, so that their rm-level labour supply becomes more elastic and discrimination
cannot prevail. As argued by Hirsch (2009), however, in a dynamic model of monopsony the
proportional gap between workers' marginal revenue product and their wages is a weighted
average of the inverse short-run and long-run rm-level labour supply elasticities, where the
former's weight is the rm's discount factor. If thus workers, both men and women, move
in the long run, so that the long-run elasticity tends to innity for both groups, and rms
discount future prots, women still get lower wages. The reason for this is simply their lower
short-run elasticity which stems from their lower average short-term mobility.
10two shifts from Figures 2 and 3 (see Figure 4): The wage dierential in the more
densely populated labour market 1 is smaller than the one in the less densely
populated 0 because the WSC in the female labour market is steeper than its
male counterpart. Furthermore, since wages are higher in more densely populated
labour markets, this also implies that the gender pay gap % is lower in these
labour markets. We thus get another prediction from the model: The gender pay
gap should be higher in less densely populated labour markets. Intuitively, more
densely populated labour markets are more protable ones. This causes competitive
entry of rms and therefore constrains employers' monopsony power over both their
female and male workers and also limits their ability to engage in Robinsonian
discrimination.
Figure 4: The gender wage dierentials 1 and 0 for segmented female and male
labour markets with worker densities D1 and D0 with D1 > D0.
2.3 Hypotheses
To sum up, our simple spatial oligopsony model delivers the following hypotheses:
(1) We expect workers to earn higher wages in hot spots than in rural areas because
they have thicker labour markets with more competition among employers.
(2) We conjecture female workers to earn lower wages, ceteris paribus, because of
their higher average (indirect) travel cost.
(3) Since we expect gender dierences in the travel cost to have become less
substantial over time (e.g., women have become more mobile relative to men
due to more or better childcare facilities), we suspect the gender pay gap to
decline over time as well.
11(4) We expect the gender pay gap to be less pronounced in hot spots than in
rural areas because the more competitive environment in hot spots constrains
employers' ability to engage in Robinsonian discrimination.
In the following empirical analysis, we will investigate to what extent these four
hypotheses generated by the model are armed by the data and therefore check the
model's success in pattern prediction.9
3 Empirical Specication
Empirically, the raw gender wage dierential is of limited information as it neglects
individual heterogeneity, such as gender dierences in the human capital endowment.
In order to deal with observed heterogeneity, two approaches have been extensively
used in the literature. The rst approach is to estimate a standard Mincerian (1974)
earnings function controlling for individual characteristics reecting the worker's
productivity, such as education and experience, and including a female dummy as
regressor. The coecient of this dummy is then supposed to give the ceteris paribus
gender pay gap that cannot be explained by dierences in workers' productivity.
A second, more sophisticated approach, pioneered by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca
(1973), estimates two separate earnings functions for female and male workers
and then decomposes the gender pay gap into an explained part due to dierent
endowments in workers' characteristics and an unexplained part. This well-known
Oaxaca{Blinder decomposition and its extensions still serve as the backbone of the
gender pay gap literature. In both approaches, the unexplained gender pay gap
is typically attributed to discrimination (though gender dierences in unobserved
characteristics may also contribute to its explanation).
Using exact matching, ~ Nopo (2008) proposes another non-parametric approach
to decompose the gender pay gap into an explained and an unexplained component.10
The intuitive idea of this empirical strategy is to use male workers with otherwise
identical personal characteristics as a comparison group for females. That is, one
compares the earnings of a female worker to the earning of male workers with the
9 Note that our model is highly stylised in some respects. For instance, workers' labour
supply behaviour is modelled simplistically just as a `1{0 decision' with all workers having
a reservation income of zero and all workers participating in the equilibrium. It is, however,
straightforward to extend the model, in a way following Bhaskar and To (1999), to allow for
varying participation of workers. This can be achieved by incorporating some heterogeneity in
reservation incomes, i.e., by considering groups of workers with dierent reservation incomes.
While this would yield a positive relationship between workers' wages and their participation
rate { and thus, as a corollary to the gender pay gap, an equilibrium gender participation rate
dierential { the model's other predictions would remain unaected. Therefore, we will not
consider this extension in detail.
10 Applications of this approach include Djurdjevic and Radyakin (2007) for Switzerland and
Black et al. (2008) for the U.S.
12same observable characteristics.11 In analogy to the regression-based decomposition
techniques, this approach allows to separate the endowment eect from the overall
gender pay gap. The unexplained part is identied by taking the mean over the log
gender wage dierences of the matched female{male observations and is comparable
to the unexplained part of the gender pay gap derived from an Oaxaca{Blinder
decomposition based on female characteristics and evaluated at the male coecients.
Technically, the unexplained gender pay gap gained from this exact matching
approach is the dierence in expected earnings for female and male workers with







b E[lnwijx;di = 1]   b E[lnwjjx;dj = 0]

c Pr[xjdi = 1]; (6)
where x is a row vector of observed characteristics, di a dummy variable taking on
the value one if individual i is female and zero otherwise, C the number of cells
containing a given combination of covariates, and S the support of x.
With highly dierentiated characteristics, however, the number of cells containing
a given combination of covariates becomes prohibitive. Consequently, nding exact
matches gets hard, and exact matching turns out to be not viable anymore. To ee
this curse of dimensionality, the matching literature has followed Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) in using the propensity score as a one-dimensional measure of similarity
between individuals. In the context of gender pay gaps, Fr olich (2007) shows that
propensity score matching can serve as a exible semi-parametric approach to
identify the unexplained part of the gap, where the appropriate propensity score
is individual i's tted conditional probability of being female, i.e., c Pr[di = 1jxi].
The main advantage of this semi-parametric approach is its exibility. Other
than the regression-based decomposition techniques, no functional form is imposed,
apart from the specication of the propensity score. But misspecication of the
earnings equation could yield misleading results. In particular, using observations
where the empirical distributions of females' and males' characteristics substantially
dier in their supports Sf and Sm could give biased results if the underlying
`out-of-support' assumption is invalid. As shown by Black et al. (2008) and ~ Nopo
(2008), common support problems yield systematically upward-biased estimates
of the unexplained part of the gender pay gap. Using a exible semi-parametric
propensity score matching approach and restricting to observations with a common
support S = Sf \ Sm, on the other hand, ensures that only those female and male
11 In terms of the program evaluation literature, the idea is to nd male `statistical twins' to
each female and to calculate the `average treatment eect on the treated' (ATT) of being
female. Of course, this would suggest an inappropriate causal interpretation of the `treatment'
sex. Notwithstanding, the basic principles of matching as a statistical approach to deal with
heterogeneity in observable characteristics remain valid.
13observations are matched that actually are comparable in terms of their observed
characteristics.
In our empirical analysis, we arrive at individuals' propensity score by tting
a probit model for their probability of being female, i.e., c Pr[di = 1jxi] = (xib )
with the estimated column vector of coecients b  and the c.d.f. of the standard
normal distribution . As matching variables we use a large number of individual
characteristics. We include actual on-the-job experience and its square as well as
tenure and its square as regressors. Furthermore, we add 13 dummies for occupation
classes, four job position dummies, three dummies for pre-labour market education,
seven establishment size dummies, a set of industry aliation dummies, and a
variable reporting the length of the employment per year.12 At this stage, it should
be mentioned that lower gender pay gaps and higher wages in hot spots may feed
back dierently on female and male workers' decision where to live and work. This,
in turn, would introduce an endogeneity problem. To alleviate this problem we
include a dummy for the type of region of rst appearance on the labour market as
additional matching variable. As a robustness check, we will also repeat the following
analysis excluding those individuals who changed their type of region after their rst
appearance on the labour market.13
After tting the propensity score, the next step is to choose a `similarity distance'
to match every female observation with comparable male observations based on
the individual propensity score. For instance, n-nearest neighbour matching with
replacement compares each female observation with its n nearest neighbours (in
terms of their propensity score) among the male observations that lie in the common
support S. For n = 1 we get nearest neighbour matching with replacement. The
individual unexplained gender pay gap is then estimated as
b %;i = lnwi   lnwj(i) (7)




c Pr[di = 1jxi;di = 1]   c Pr[dj = 1jxj;dj = 0]
 
 (8)
with xi 2 S. The expected unexplained gender pay gap in the sample is then
estimated simply as
12 Note that we cannot control for the worker's marital status and number of children due to
data constraints, see footnote 17.
13 Unfortunately, we cannot control for endogenous migration between dierent types of regions








where I denotes the total number of matched females.
Of course, this is not the only way to form female{male matches. In the following,
we will use nearest neighbour matching without replacement and kernel matching.
While the prior uses every male observation only once and is therefore, arguably, the
most restrictive procedure, kernel matching utilises all male observations within the
common support for every female observation. It does so by attaching lower weights
to more distant observations (in terms of their propensity score), where the weights
follow from a kernel estimate of the characteristics distribution.14 The corresponding
standard errors and condence intervals are computed using bootstrapping with 100
replications. As a check of robustness, we will also apply the standard Oaxaca{
Blinder decomposition technique.
To identify dierences in the unexplained component of the gender pay gap
between hot spots and rural areas, we will estimate E[%] for both types of regions
separately. Comparing the resulting estimates, we will argue that they dier if their
bootstrapped condence intervals do not overlap. But before we will put this into
practice, we have to describe our data set used.
4 Data
In the following, we shall use social security data from the Institute for Employment
Research (Institut f ur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB). Our data set is the
Regional File of the IAB Employment Samples (IAB-REG) which is a 2 per cent
random sample from the employment register of Germany's Federal Employment
Agency (Bundesagentur f ur Arbeit).15 The German social security system requires
rms to record the stock of workers at least at the beginning and the end of
each year. Additionally, all changes in employment relationships within the year
(e.g., hirings, quits, and dismissals) have to be reported with the exact information
on the date when the change occurred. Therefore, the employment register traces
detailed histories for each worker's time in covered employment as well as spells of
unemployment for which the worker received unemployment benets.16 This large
14 Since these two approaches can be regarded as the two `extremes' of possible matching
procedures, it may be interesting to consider a somewhere-in-between procedure as well.
Therefore, we will also apply three-nearest neighbour matching with replacement, results of
which are reported in Appendix Figure A.1.
15 The data are briey described in Bender et al. (2000) and in more detail in Bender et al.
(1996).
16 Episodes of unemployment during which the worker has no entitlement to unemployment
benets are not reported and thus cannot be distinguished from periods of non-participation
15data set ranges from 1975 to 2004 and includes all workers, salaried employees, and
trainees obliged to pay social security contributions. All in all, it covers more than
80 per cent of all those employed. Since they are not covered by social security, civil
servants, family workers, and self-employed are not included. As misreporting leads
to sanctions for the employer, the information on periods of coverage and earnings
is highly reliable.
The data include, among others thing, information for every employee on the
daily gross wage, censored at the social security contribution ceiling, on several
individual, and on some establishment characteristics. Characteristics contained
are, among others, the worker's age, skill level, sex, job status, occupation,
and nationality and the employer's industry, location at the district level, and
establishment size.17 Not included, however, is a variable with quantitative
information on the hours worked. Although the data set comprises a qualitative
variable distinguishing between full-time and two sorts of part-time work, this limits
the information value of the daily gross wages contained in the data because we
cannot infer workers' wage rates from them. Hence, we restrict our sample to
individuals working full time in order to account for the problem of missing working
hours information.18
In the following empirical analysis, we only consider individuals in western
Germany who are employed full time on the 30th of June in each year. Additionally,
we exclude part-time workers, home workers, trainees, and spells of minor
employment. Since we argue that new social trends and especially changes in
gender mobility patterns are rst visible for entrants in the labour market and
young workers, we restrict our sample to individuals between 25 and 34 years old.
The lower bound ensures that most individuals have completed their education.
Furthermore, the upper bound additionally alleviates a problem with the wage data,
viz., daily gross wages are censored at the social security contribution ceiling. Since
this censoring problem bites only for high-wage observations, we exclude high-skilled
workers, i.e., workers with higher education (Abitur, which is the German equivalent
to A-levels or graduation from high school) and a completed vocational training or
with a university type of education. Together, the age restriction and the exclusion
in the labour market.
17 Unfortunately, the data include information on the worker's marital status and number of
children only due to notications made in the case of changes in employment that are relevant
according to benet entitlement rules. Using this information would clearly introduce a severe
selectivity problem. Consequently, we will not be able to use it in the following analysis.
18 One might argue that higher daily earnings of male workers could be the consequence of gender
dierences in hours worked. Restricting to full-time employees again alleviates this potential
problem. Moreover, this explanation would be at odds with dierences in the gender pay gap
between hot spots and rural areas because taking dierences should eliminate this working
hours eect (provided the gender distribution of working hours is suciently similar between
full-time workers in the two types of regions).
16of high-skilled workers minimise the problem of censored wages as the number of
top-coded observations in our sample is negligible.19
We are aware of possible job instability for female workers. Therefore, we
constructed a series of actual rather than potential experience on the job, where
only periods of active employment are counted.20 In a similar way, a measure of
tenure is calculated as the total time period worked within the same rm.
Another limitation in the data set is that, despite a high precision for the earnings
variable, information on personal characteristics might suer from reporting errors.
This could especially aect the skill variables. Several attempts have been made to
correct the qualication information contained in IAB-REG, most notably the widely
applied approach by Fitzenberger et al. (2006). Notwithstanding, we will follow a
dierent route here: For most observations the data cover the complete training,
employment, and unemployment history. Therefore, the individual skill level can be
checked by taking all these spells into account. We apply the following procedure:
Cases where the skill level is almost unambiguous according to the employment
histories are used to t a logit model for the conditional probability of having
a certain skill level. In a next step, using the model's estimated coecients, this
probability is predicted for the `uncertain' cases given the full set of information on
the individual's employment history. Finally, we scan the whole employment history
for each individual including the imputed skill level formed from the results of the
logit estimations in order to check for consistency and to correct the qualications
accordingly.
Eventually, for the assignment of districts to rural areas and hot spots we
use a classication scheme developed by the German Federal Oce for Building
and Regional Planning (Bundesamt f ur Bauwesen und Raumordnung, BBR). This
scheme distinguishes between areas with large agglomerations, areas with features of
conurbation, and areas of rural character, each of these again being subdivided into
dierent groups. All in all, it dierentiates between nine types of regions (districts)
at the NUTS (nomenclature des unit es territoriales statistiques) 3 level according to
their population density and accessibility. We dene economic hot spots as western
Germany's eight biggest metropolitan areas: Cologne, Dortmund, D usseldorf, Essen,
Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, and Stuttgart. All hot spots are metropolitan core
cities (BBR type 1). As rural areas we choose all districs with BBR types 7 to 9 (see
Figure 5).21
19 In our sample, only 2.5 per cent of all observations contain censored wages. This number is
slightly higher for men (3.3 per cent) than for women (0.9 per cent) and also for hot spots
(4.3 per cent) than for rural areas (0.9 per cent).
20 Note, however, that for observations prior to the end of the 1980s the measure of actual
experience might be biased due to left censoring of employment spells in the data.
21 BBR type 7 consists of rural districts in regions with intermediate agglomeration. BBR type 8









Notes: Hot spots are dened as the eight biggest metropolitan areas in
western Germany coloured in black. The gray areas display the rural
areas characterised by BBR types 7 to 9.
Figure 5: Hot spots and rural areas.
5 Descriptive Evidence
First of all, we present some descriptive evidence. The upper graph in Figure 6 shows
a scatter plot of average gross daily wages of full-time employed young females and
males of the 327 western German NUTS 3 regions in 2004 and the population density
per region (measured as population per square kilometre) including trend lines.
Three things are noteworthy: Firstly, the average wage is rising in the population
density both for males and females. This is in line with our rst hypothesis that
workers earn higher wages in more densely populated labour markets. Second, the
average wage is higher for males than for females and thus points at a gender pay
gap, our second hypothesis. Third, the trend line for females appears to be steeper
than that for males. This level eect points at a lower wage dierential in hot spots
than in rural areas and therefore, in particular, at a lower gender pay gap. In the
lower graph in Figure 6, we see that the average raw gender pay gap is indeed
decreasing (in absolute value) in the population density. Put dierently, when not
18€
Figure 6: Average wages and raw gender pay gaps at the NUTS 3 regional level
by population density (the respective solid lines are trend lines resulting
from a univariate regression).
controlling for individual characteristics, the gap is more pronounced in rural areas
than in cities. This is consistent with our fourth hypothesis that the gender pay gap
should be lower in hot spots.
19Figure 7 shows the evolution of the average raw gender pay gaps in hot spots and
rural areas from 1975 to 2004. It is worth mentioning that both gaps are substantially
declining over time by almost 16 percentage points. While women in rural areas (hot
spots) earned on average about 38 per cent (25 per cent) less than men in 1975, this
pay gap has narrowed to 22 per cent (9 per cent) in 2004. What is more, the dierence
in the gaps between hot spots and rural areas remained strikingly stable during this
long period of time, oscillating around 13 percentage points. While the reduction in
the gaps in both hot spots and rural areas are in line with our third hypothesis of
declining gender pay gaps over time, the latter nding is consistent with our fourth
hypothesis at the heart of this paper, viz., that the gender pay gap should be lower
in hot spots than in rural areas.
Figure 7: Average raw gender pay gaps in hot spots and rural areas 1975{2004.
6 Multivariate Evidence
While it is reassuring to see that there is supportive descriptive evidence to all
our hypotheses, we now turn to our multivariate results. As laid out in detail in
Section 3, we will in the following present estimates gained from a semi-parametric
propensity score matching approach to the unexplained part of the gender pay
gap as put forward by Fr olich (2007). We used both nearest neighbour matching
without replacement and kernel matching as the most and least restrictive methods
in terms of the number of male observations used to create a `synthetic' male
20comparison observation for each female observation in the common support of
observed characteristics.22 For each of the years 1975 to 2004 we estimate the
unexplained gender pay gap in both hot spots and rural areas employing nearest
neighbour and kernel matching. The corresponding standard errors and condence
intervals are calculated using bootstrapping with 100 replications. The results
obtained from nearest neighbour matching are shown in Figure 8, those obtained
from kernel matching in Figure 9, where the thin dashed lines represent the respective
95 per cent condence bands. Since the results of both approaches are very similar,
we shall discuss them simultaneously.23
First of all, our second hypothesis is clearly conrmed. Young full-time employed
females earn signicantly less than males with the same (observed) characteristics.
This even holds after controlling for experience, tenure, education, job position,
occupation, establishment size, industry, length of employment, and region of rst
entrance in the labour market.24 And this is valid both in economic hot spots and
rural areas.
Second, while this unexplained pay gap narrowed considerably in both types of
regions during our observation period, it is still of substantial size. In the mid-1970s,
it was about 35 per cent (25 per cent) in rural areas (hot spots) and only 22 per cent
(15 per cent) at the beginning of the new millennium. This gradual decline is highly
supportive to our third hypothesis. Moreover, this strikingly parallel development
in both types of regions points at our next nding.
Third, and most importantly, there is a considerable dierence between rural
areas and hot spots. In each of the 30 years considered, the gender pay gap
is smaller in hot spots than in rural areas. While this dierence is statistically
signicant throughout, it is also economically signicant: The gender pay gap is
about 10 percentage points lower in hot spots than in rural areas. What is more,
this dierence is remarkably stable over time (with a small decline in the point
22 Since nearest neighbour matching without replacement uses male observations only once to
form a comparison observation for females, there were clearly more female observations where
no male could be matched than with the other matching methods. In this case, the results are
only valid for the matched individuals. On the other hand, the resulting matched female{male
observations were highly balanced with indistinguishable observed characteristics in nearly all
cases, while this balancing property was satised to a lesser degree by the samples obtained
from the less restrictive matching methods. Since results proved to be highly robust across
specications, we conclude that neither the absence of perfect balancing nor external validity
seems to be a problem.
23 Note that basically the same results are found when using three nearest neighbour matching
with replacement, results of which are shown in Appendix Figure A.1.
24 Note that this unexplained pay gap may not only be due to discrimination but also due
to dierences in unobserved characteristics which we cannot control for. Therefore, this
unexplained gap is likely to overestimate the impact of discrimination. Though one could
argue that dierences in unobservables would net out when taking dierences between the
two types of region if unobservables were equally distributed between hot spots and rural
areas, we will not do so as this seems to be a far-fetched assumption in our eyes.
21Figure 8: Unexplained gender pay gaps in hot spots and rural areas 1975{2004
using nearest neighbour matching without replacement (the thin dashed
lines represent the respective 95 per cent condence bands).
Figure 9: Unexplained gender pay gaps in hot spots and rural areas 1975{2004
using kernel matching (the thin dashed lines represent the respective
95 per cent condence bands).
22estimate in the two last years of observation) and therefore clearly arms our fourth
hypothesis.
Figure 10: Unexplained gender pay gaps in hot spots and rural areas 1975{
2004 using the Oaxaca{Blinder decomposition (the thin dashed lines
represent the respective 95 per cent condence bands).
Basically, the same picture arises when applying the standard Oaxaca{Blinder
decomposition technique (with females as reference group) results of which are shown
in Figure 10. The same also holds when only those individuals are included in the
analysis who stayed in the same regional type of rst appearance in the labour
market (see Appendix Figure A.2). As argued above, this robustness check indicates
that the endogeneity problem arising because individuals can choose to live and
work in a hot spot is only of minor importance in this context.25
All in all, our very robust empirical ndings strongly corroborate the four
hypotheses derived from our theoretical model. Firstly, workers' wages are higher
25 Note that also a sample selection problem may arise due to the participation decisions
of women. A possible solution would be to take these participation decisions explicitly
into account and to apply Heckman's (1979) two-stage procedure. Our data set, however,
does not contain a personal characteristic that could serve as a reliable instrument for
women's participation decision. As argued by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008), however, if
non-participation is non-random and participating women therefore have more favourable
characteristics, then dierences in the gender pay gap may be explained by dierences in the
participation gap. In our sample, the participation rate of females is almost identical in hot
spots and rural areas (69 vs. 70 per cent), as is the female full-time employment ratio (44 vs.
43 per cent). Therefore, it seems implausible that our results are driven by participation
dierences, whereas the initial sample selection problem is likely to net out when considering
the hot spot{rural dierence in the pay gaps.
23in more densely populated areas. Second, women earn signicantly less than
comparable men both in hot spots and rural areas. Third, the unexplained gender
pay gap is decreasing over time in both types of regions. Fourth, the gap is
signicantly lower in hot spots than in rural areas. Strikingly, our main nding
is that this hot spot{rural dierence in the pay gap is almost constant over the
entire period of 30 years without any sign of a catching-up process.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated regional dierences in the gender pay gap
between hot spots and rural areas for young full-time workers and their evolution
over time using a large micro data set from western Germany ranging from 1975{
2004. Our empirical results strongly support the hypotheses generated from a spatial
oligopsony model where women are less mobile due to more domestic responsibilities.
According to this model, hot spots have thick labour markets giving rise to a more
competitive environment. This not only pushes wages in hot spots but also constrains
employers' ability to engage in monopsonistic Robinsonian discrimination. Other
than under Beckerian discrimination due to distaste, rms do not forego prots when
discriminating against women. Robinsonian discrimination is therefore more likely
to survive in the long run and represents in our eyes a more convincing economic
explanation of the gender pay gap.
In our empirical analysis, we used a semi-parametric propensity score matching
approach to identify the unexplained part of the gender pay gap. Other than the
standard regression-based decomposition techniques, such as the Oaxaca{Blinder
decomposition, this technique is more exible in terms of the imposed functional
form and does not rely on an `out-of-support' assumption, i.e., it compares only
female and male observations with characteristics in their common support.
Our main result is that the unexplained gender pay gap is about 10 percentage
points larger in rural areas compared to hot spots. While the unexplained gap both in
hot spots and rural areas gradually decreases over time, the hot spot{rural dierence
remains astonishingly stable. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper
to investigate and nd such a stable dierence over a long period of time. In the
context of our model, the interpretation of these ndings would be that the gender
dierence in mobility gradually shrank over time, leading to a decrease in the gender
pay gaps, whereas the dierent competitive environment in hot spots and rural areas
persisted. That is to say, labour markets of hot spots remained more competitive
with more rms in them, limiting employers' ability to discriminate against women.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Unexplained gender pay gaps in hot spots and rural areas 1975{2004
using three-nearest neighbour matching with replacement (the thin
dashed lines represent the respective 95 per cent condence bands).
28Figure A.2: Unexplained gender pay gaps in hot spots and rural areas 1975{
2004 using only individuals without change of regional type of
rst appearance in the labour market and three-nearest neighbour
matching with replacement (the thin dashed lines represent the
respective 95 per cent condence bands).
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